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Abstract 
Political liberty is at the centre of liberal conceptions of toleration. 
Liberal political philosophers disagree about the limits of toleration, 
whether equality is central to liberal toleration, and the toleration of 
illiberal religious and cultural practices, among other topics. Some 
non-liberal states adopt a model of toleration, despite significant 
limitations on liberty. Moreover, some recent work in comparative 
philosophy emphasizes pluralism across traditions of political morality. 
This chapter will consider a variety of positions on liberal toleration as 
well as the challenge to liberal toleration posed by ethical pluralism. 
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Introduction 
Toleration is fundamental to liberalism. Yet liberal political philosophers do not agree 
about the justification for toleration, the limits of toleration or whether every society is 
obligated to adopt a liberal conception of toleration. Does toleration depend on the harm 
principle (Mill, 1978)? Does liberal toleration depend on a basic right to justification 
(Forst, 2013)? Does a principle of toleration apply to political philosophy itself (Rawls, 
1996)? Does liberal toleration require accommodating illiberal practices within liberal 
states? Is liberal toleration compatible with gender-egalitarian policies designed to make 
it harder for certain marriage and family practices to persist (Schouten, 2019)? What is the 
relation between toleration and neutrality (Balint, 2017)? Do those who affirm a 
collectivistic conception of political morality have an obligation to meet the requirements 
of a liberal conception of toleration? These and other questions generate disagreement 
about liberal toleration. Liberals continue to debate these and related topics about the basis 
for toleration, and how we should treat one another within and across diverse societies. In 
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some ways debates about toleration are similar to debates about liberty and equality: 
shared concepts do not entail shared conceptions. 
Some ideas unite competing conceptions of toleration (Forst, 2017). One is that to 
tolerate is to be willing to permit something one opposes. Another is that political liberty 
is a moral basis for toleration. The first agreement point – that to tolerate is to be willing 
to permit some things one finds objectionable – is central to the very idea of toleration. 
The second agreement point – that political liberty requires toleration – is central to 
liberalism. Putting the two together, we can characterize, in abstract, the fundamental idea 
behind liberal conceptions of toleration as follows: citizens and government should affirm 
a right to liberty and in doing so respect the diversity and pluralism that respect for liberty 
permits. There are important debates about which conception of liberty is most 
appropriate, whether political values such as equality should inform liberal toleration or 
whether the individualism that informs liberal political morality is a bias that reflects 
dominant western religious and cultural identities. Yet common ground – liberty is a 
primary basis for toleration – and the disputed ground – applications, universalism and 
limits – can be stated in this way. 
This chapter will consider liberalism and toleration with three issues in focus: liberal 
and non-liberal conceptions of toleration, toleration and equality, and toleration and 
pluralism. First, it adapts ideas from Rainer Forst’s taxonomy (2013, 2017) of conceptions 
of toleration. Non-liberal conceptions of toleration will be briefly considered as well. 
Second, it examines some ways that equality in status is relevant to liberal toleration. 
Being a Muslim American and being a Protestant American correlate with different social 
statuses, irrespective of an official state policy of religious equality. This is relevant to 
questions about liberal toleration. Third, it considers pluralism as a challenge to liberal 
toleration. When considering toleration from the standpoint of comparative or global 
philosophy some traditional liberal convictions about political morality may be harder to 
maintain. Finally, I conclude with a proposal to explore new ways that liberal political 
philosophers can approach toleration. 
1. Varieties of Toleration: Conceptions and Practices 
Toleration does not depend on liberal political values. Liberty as a moral basis for 
toleration is something that distinguishes liberal from non-liberal conceptions of 
toleration. A conception of toleration that does not rest upon the idea of a fundamental 
right to liberty is non-liberal. Two examples of non-liberal conceptions of toleration are 
coexistence and permission (Forst, 2013, pp. 27–29). 
Illiberal Toleration. Religious, ethnic or cultural groups might accept a principle of 
toleration because they believe that coexistence is preferable to violence. The Hobbesian 
principle, “seek peace if others are willing to seek peace” can serve as the basis for a 
coexistence practice of toleration. In some contexts, this might be the most feasible 
alternative to significant hostilities. For example, following a long and protracted conflict, 
members of different religious, ethnic or cultural groups who are unwilling to affirm a 
principle of liberty might be willing to accept a kind of modus vivendi as preferable to 
open hostilities and conflict. 
Some authoritarian states enact another kind of non-liberal toleration. For example, a 
hegemonic state might grant minority groups permission to practise a religion, speak a 
minority language or maintain a cultural practice conditioned on loyalty to the state and 
acceptance of official status inequalities. The Ottoman state policy of imposing lower tax 
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burdens on Muslims while permitting Greek and Armenian Christian religious practices is 
an example of the permission conception of toleration. The Ottoman millet system also 
granted individual millets the authority to adopt their own marriage and family law along 
with limited autonomy in some other areas of life. Official inequality in status between 
privileged subjects and other groups is one way that this permission model of toleration 
differs from a liberal model. As with coexistence, the permission conception does not 
presuppose political liberty. Nevertheless, the permission conception does represent a form 
of toleration as can be shown by contrasting it with the oppression and intolerance within 
other kinds of authoritarian regimes. 
By contrast with the Ottoman millet system, current Chinese policy in contemporary 
Xinjiang province is designed to force-assimilate Uighurs into an imagined national 
identity (Jacobs, 2017). This is just oppression. State policy directed at the language, 
culture, or religion of its own population, with the aim to radically reshape the group’s 
identity, is a kind of internal colonialism. Forced-assimilation was not the aim of the 
Ottoman millet system. In that respect treatment of Greek Orthodox and other groups is 
an example the permission conception of toleration. 
Coexistence and permission count as a form of toleration without liberty in the sense 
that groups of religious or cultural minorities are accommodated, but not on the basis of 
fundamental political rights. A regime based on one of these conceptions of toleration will 
be deficient according to a liberal perspective on toleration. 
Some liberal states treat religious minorities in ways that violate standard norms of 
liberal tolerance. Sometimes minority groups face persecution within liberal states to a 
greater extent than in non-liberal states. Liberal states founded by settler colonists, such as 
the US and Australia, treated indigenous minority groups with extreme intolerance. 
Internal colonialism is not unique to illiberal states. Both policies and treatment of Native 
Americans in the nineteenth century was genocidal; the Ottoman millet system was not. 
Sometimes liberal states adopt intolerant policies towards some groups, and sometimes 
citizens in liberal states are not prevented from harming unpopular groups. Mormons in 
the nineteenth century, and Jehovah’s Witness in the early twentieth century, were subject 
to significant hostilities by both citizens and state actors in the US. Violence against 
Jehovah’s Witness in early-twentieth-century America involved mobs who attacked a 
religious minority they believed were disloyal Americans and whose understanding of 
Christianity differed from the mainline Protestant identity reflected in the majority 
religious identity (Smith, 2015, pp. 119–150). An account of toleration should be able to 
reckon with these and many other kinds of cases. 
Liberal Toleration. A liberal conception of toleration will affirm liberty as a fundamental 
value. On a liberal view, toleration is required by liberty. Peter Balint expresses the basic 
idea behind a liberal position on toleration that is endorsed by liberals ranging from Mill 
to Rawls and many others: “I take it as a fundamental tenet of liberalism that it is 
interference, rather than non-interference that must be justified” (Balint, 2017, p. 11). On 
the view toleration is required by political liberty, including freedom of religion, 
expression and association. Liberty is the basis for the respect conception of toleration 
(Forst, 2013, pp. 29–30). Forst calls this the respect conception and by doing so refers to 
a set of views on liberal toleration according to which affirming individual liberties, such 
as freedom of thought or liberty of conscience, is an important moral basis for toleration. 
To illustrate the respect conception, let’s consider an example from American case law. 
In West VA v Barnette (1943) the Court ruled on whether children in a public school can 
be compelled to affirm a pledge to the American flag. Even today many American citizens 
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support a practice of requiring children in public schools to recite a pledge to the civic and 
political values widely believed to be central to American national identity (Rasmussen 
Reports, 2013). On this view, a mandatory pledge of allegiance does not violate neutrality. 
By contrast, were a public school to require students to participate in a religious ritual, or 
to affirm a religious viewpoint, many citizens would agree that this violates neutrality, and 
also the liberty of conscience affirmed by the First Amendment. The main idea is this: 
whereas a mandatory religious service for children in public schools would compel a 
citizen to endorse a religious viewpoint in violation of religious neutrality, a political or 
civic ritual affirming the shared bases for citizenship does not violate neutrality in the 
relevant sense. It matters that Barnette was decided in 1943, before the phrase “one nation 
under God” was added to the pledge of allegiance. That phrase was added in 1954 (Shiffrin 
and Blasi, 2009). We can refer to the pre-1954 version as a secular-political pledge. 
Is it intolerant for a liberal state to compel students in a public school to assert a secular-
political pledge of the sort challenged in Barnette? In the early twentieth century, some 
Jehovah’s Witness opposed the mandatory pledge in public schools claiming the policy 
requires their children to engage in a kind of idolatry. Since the prohibition on idolatry is 
a religious obligation, the mandatory secular-pledge, according to this view, requires 
children to disavow a core principle of their religious faith. Whereas an oath to God is a 
matter of religious duty, the mandatory pledge is compelled by a secular state, and so it 
constitutes a pledge to a political not religious authority. We can imagine other, similar 
claims. For example, suppose a Muslim parent objected to the pledge on grounds that 
Islam requires Muslims to affirm a principle of monotheism according to which, “there is 
no God but God”. Suppose the Muslim parent insisted that a mandatory pledge puts the 
state and its education policy between her child and God, forcing a student to choose 
between a religious obligation and an official state policy. We can also imagine a secular 
citizen claiming it is a violation of liberty to compel citizens to participate in a mandatory 
loyalty ritual. In addition to the social stigma of non-conformity to a mass loyalty ritual, 
the injury to liberty of conscience, whether religious or secular, is a serious consideration 
this case. 
Although in Barnette the Court did not consider the hypothetical cases of a Muslim or 
a non-religious opponent to the mandatory pledge in public schools, both the real and 
hypothetical examples show how a mandatory pledge of this sort might be objectionable 
to some citizens. Since liberty is the basis for a respect conception of toleration, we need 
to unpack the idea of liberty to see how a liberal conception of toleration might handle 
cases like this one. 
Seanna Shiffrin’s “thinker-based approach” (Shiffrin, 2011) to liberty of thought offers 
a perspicuous account of why a case like Barnette is not a debate over trifles. In an 
insightful passage, Shiffrin summarizes some of the moral dimensions to liberty of 
thought, with WV v. Barnette in view: 
What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge is that the motive behind the 
regulation, and the possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought 
processes of the compelled speaker. Significantly, the compelled speaker is also a 
compelled listener and is compelled to adopt postures that typically connote 
identification with her message. The aim, and I believe the potential effect, is to try 
to influence the speaker to associate herself with the message and implicitly to 
accept it, but through means that bypass the deliberative faculties of the agent. 
Compelled speech of this kind threatens (or at least aims) to interfere with free 
thinking processes of the speaker/listener and to influence mental content in ways 
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and through methods that are illicit: nontransparent, via repetition, and through 
coercive manipulation of a character virtue, namely that of sincerity, that itself is 
closely connected to commitments of freedom of speech. (Shiffrin, 2011, p. 302) 
On this view, the mandatory pledge is a violation of freedom of thought. The practice 
cannot be reconciled to the idea of respect for liberty at the heart of a liberal regime that 
professes a commitment to toleration. 
The thinker-based approach to freedom of expression provides a compelling illustration 
of why liberty of thought is important to individuals. In doing so it highlights something 
that is fundamental to the liberty that a conception of liberal toleration is supposed to 
protect: freedom of thought, a fundamental interest that persons have to express their 
agency without coercive interference. Liberty on this view is inclusive of freedom of 
association and freedom of religion, among other freedoms. 
Whether aligned with a thinker-based approach or some other liberal conception of 
liberty, a respect conception of toleration can side with those who oppose a mandatory 
pledge, like the one in dispute in Barnette. That kind of compelled loyalty oath in the face 
of a religious or other value-based objection, is a form of intolerance. It denies someone 
the liberty of thought that is at the base of liberal political morality. It is a harder question 
to decide which forms of political loyalty are legitimately enforceable and by what means 
such loyalty may be enforced. For example, judges or politicians take an oath as a 
condition for serving in an official capacity. In the US citizens cannot be compelled to take 
an oath on the basis of a religious doctrine, because the Constitution prohibits a religious 
test as a condition for public office. Yet public servants can be required to take a political 
oath. 
Is it unreasonable from the standpoint of toleration to require police and many other 
agents of the state to take an oath to comply with norms governing their professional 
obligations as agents of the state? An agent of the state has a different status, legally and 
morally, than a subject of a state. Legally, because the state authorizes their power; morally, 
because their legally authorized power is exercised on citizens. Agents of the state are still 
citizens of course, so policies that govern this area must serve multiple aims. One is to 
guarantee that the policing authority of government reflects legitimate political values, 
rather than the private judgment of the public servant. Another is to refrain from curtailing 
the liberty of public servants in their official capacities beyond what is necessary to 
maintain the first aim. If we grant this perspective, we can say that as an agent of the state 
one’s role is defined by the political authority the agent represents. The liberty at the root 
of toleration applies foremost to citizens exercising their own judgments on behalf of their 
own views. 
The respect conception of toleration is well suited to handle conflicts between 
expressions of liberty and state policy. In Liberty of Conscience Nussbaum construes the 
conflict between piety and secular law as an Antigone Dilemma (Nussbaum, 2008, 
pp. 116–120). That framing is apt, because the conflict is a result of perceived 
irreconcilable demands on a person’s conscience. There can be non-religious versions of 
this dilemma too. A non-religious citizen might object to mandatory flag salutes on 
grounds that mass loyalty oaths compelled by the state are an affront to freedom of thought. 
A respect conception of toleration will favour minimizing Antigone Dilemmas either by 
eliminating policies that create them, or by granting exemptions to accommodate those 
with conscientious objections to legitimate state policy. There are hard questions about 
limits. Yet as a matter of framing liberal toleration, Nussbaum’s position as well as 
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Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to freedom of thought represent examples of how liberty 
is a basis for the respect conception of toleration. 
Stated as a general view that ranges across conceptions of liberalism the respect 
conception, “proceeds from a morally grounded form of mutual respect on the part of the 
individuals or groups who exercise toleration” (Forst, 2013, p. 29). Citizens and 
government are tolerant when they permit activities protected by political liberties such as 
religious freedom, freedom of association, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression. 
Some liberals will put more emphasis on non-interference as the basis for political liberty; 
others will emphasize a principle of equal liberty of all compatible with liberty for each; 
some will invoke the idea of a right to justification; yet all liberal positions on toleration 
will place political liberty at the centre. 
2. Toleration and Equality 
Some forms of identity standout because they correlate highly with inequality. Though not 
an exhaustive list, the following are familiar examples: culture, religion, ethnicity and 
class. Inequalities that correlate with these forms of identity may be material, symbolic, 
social or political. For members of some groups, inequalities will be manifest in more than 
one or even all of these forms. Some liberal political philosophers claim that a liberal view 
on toleration should take status inequalities seriously (Galeotti, 2002. 
In an early defence of multicultural liberalism Charles Taylor (1994) once advanced the 
claim that recognition is the appropriate attitude towards diversity, partly on grounds that 
every culture is centred on some intrinsic values that are unique to that culture. Respect 
for the value of diversity is another consideration. On Anna Galeotti’s view, “toleration as 
recognition does not imply taking sides” (Galeotti, 2019, p. 6). Rather it offers “a public 
declaration that a given practice . . . is a legitimate option among others” (Galeotti, 2019, 
p. 6). A third consideration that has been develped in greater detail by those defending 
multicultural liberalism emphasizes ways that cultural and other identities matter to those 
who affirm such identities. For example, Alan Patten’s equal recognition approach is based 
on the principle that persons should have a fair opportunity to pursue meaningful 
conceptions of the good life (Patten, 2014). 
Some status inequalities might be judged to correlate with choices under fair 
background conditions, such as choosing membership in a reclusive religious community 
when other options are open. A citizen who elects to remain a committed Old Order Amish 
in the US will in doing so give up a number of opportunities ranging from university 
education, a lucrative career in cybersecurity, among other pursuits that in principle are 
open to everyone. She will also be seen as a kind of outsider by many members of the 
majority culture. Provided this affiliation is chosen, it might seem that all things considered 
her material and political status is not objectionable. 
However, the politics of tolerating minority groups is often far more complicated. When 
status inequalities correlate with patterns of discrimination emphasizing a liberty right to 
choose membership in the group whose members have “opted out” of options is 
disrespectful. Consider those who insist that sexual orientation “is a choice”, not because 
they celebrate liberty and toleration, but because they want to discriminate. Religious 
bigotry is sometimes expressed on a similar basis. A person might be convinced that their 
anti-Muslim bias is motivated by a judgment that, since someone chooses to be a Muslim, 
it is acceptable to express anti-Muslim views. If an “anti-Muslim” judgment is about a 
religious doctrine and not a person’s identity in any fundamental sense, so the person 
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reasons, this is not a form of objectionable prejudice. An appropriate reply to this is “not 
so fast!” Reasons to challenge that view include that the colour of a person’s skin will 
often determine whether a judgment of anti-Muslim bias is made; whether a Muslim is a 
woman and if so whether she wears a headscarf may trigger a judgment of anti-Muslim 
bias; and many other factors ranging from nationality to language can influence the anti-
Muslim bias expressed by those who claim they are simply making a judgment about a 
doctrine and not a person. In actuality intolerance of persons is often conflated with value 
judgments about a doctrine. 
An American Muslim has a place in the collective imaginary of American national 
identity that is very different from that of a Protestant Christian. Despite an official state 
policy prohibiting religious discrimination many opportunities will be more difficult to 
realize for an American Muslim. If she wears a hijab, has dark skin or is a recent 
immigrant, these factors will affect her status. If she is outspoken or critical of state policy, 
her loyalty may well be questioned. There is a clear double standard here: white Protestant 
citizens can engage in far more forms of dissent without their loyalty being called into 
question. Many Americans believe the proposition, “we are a Christian nation”. This belief 
is often expressed in a way that equivocates between a merely demographic statement and 
a normative claim about equality in status. This obfuscation is sometimes intentional: “we 
are a Christian nation” is a familiar way to mark those who do not squarely fit into the 
imagined national identity with a kind of outsider status, regardless of nationality. From a 
purely legal standpoint, citizenship might confer equal status, but politics and culture often 
deviate from that legal standpoint. The toleration as recognition approach may be better 
able to address this issue than a traditional respect conception. 
Political discourse in the service of a majoritarian identity, real or imagined, usually 
downplays the many effects of unequal status. Unequal status can undermine what Rawls 
termed, “the social bases for self-respect” (Rawls, 1996). Whether the idea of liberal 
neutrality associated with the respect conception of toleration is objectionably difference-
blind is one issue taken up by proponents of a recognition approach to toleration. 
According to Galeotti the standard liberal view on toleration, “makes it impossible to 
recognize the issue of unequal membership” and thus, “all differences become equally 
invisible from a political standpoint” (Galeotti, 2002, p. 67). Toleration as recognition is 
motivated in part to address status inequalities. Another version of the toleration as 
recognition approach combines ideas about fairness, such equality of opportunity, and 
liberty. For example, Patten defends an equal recognition approach (Patten, 2014). On his 
view, each member of a liberal society should have an equal opportunity for self-
determination. The site of recognition on Patten’s conception is the liberty to pursue 
conceptions of value or the good under background conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
Proponents of the recognition approach do not reject the idea that liberty is essential to 
toleration. The tolerant open society will protect the one from the many by standing behind 
the liberty right to be different. Yet a central question is, how so? Will a tolerant open 
society remain neutral towards status inequalities, except in clear cases of coercion that 
violate a non-interference criterion? Or will a tolerant open society also commit to 
mitigating effects of inequalities in status? There is a morally relevant difference between 
an effort by a Christian majority to prevent the construction of a mosque – all liberals 
concur that a tolerant open society will oppose that effort – and the asymmetrical statuses 
that correlate with majority and minority religious statuses, not just in private but also 
public domains. Should a liberal conception of toleration focus only on the former? 
Error! No text of specified style in document. Liberalism and Toleration 
 
Oftentimes there are no easy answers to questions about cases, in part because there are 
almost always multiple factors in play. For example, past discrimination against a religious 
minority can be salient to contemporary politics; intergenerational effects of bias can be 
reflected in state policy; status privileged citizens often resist calls to recognize 
inequalities in status, and resist efforts to address them even more so; and proxies for bias 
often serve as tools that permit messaging strategies that affirm a form of bigotry under 
the guise of something else. Status anxiety among members of a dominant group whose 
effort to maintain dominance can inspire various forms of intolerance. Any person judged 
to be a threat to status dominance is a possible target of resentment. White racial 
resentment in the American context is a paradigm case. Richard Hofstadter (1964) offered 
a classic formulation of this idea when discussing the American Civil Rights Movement. 
Moreover, when members of a group that has been subject to intolerance demand better 
treatment, resentment on the part of those who favour the intolerance, most especially from 
those who benefit from it in the form of status privilege, is a common response. 
Institutions may or may not be complicit in objectionable unequal statuses. Yet even 
when they are not, equality in status matters across a range of contexts from interpersonal 
relations, employment opportunities for high status positions and access to political office. 
A main focus of classical liberal theory is on questions about political authority and the 
state’s role in protecting citizens’ political liberty. Yet the power conferred by privileged 
status benefits some in formal and informal contexts, sometimes irrespective of state 
policy. Offices and opportunities, ranging from official positions in government to 
opportunities to pursue various careers, may be more or less open to a citizen in virtue of 
her religious identity. Should a tolerant society seek means to ensure that if persons pursue 
a permissible conception of the good this does not correlate with status inequalities? And 
if so, by what means? 
Critics of the recognition approach sometimes argue that a liberal conception of 
toleration should not compromise on the idea that liberty is the primary basis for toleration. 
Those who defend a recognition approach to toleration can respond by pointing out that 
one ought not to have a diminished status in the political community merely because of 
one’s membership in a cultural or religious group. 
Patten’s equal recognition approach is one way to take on the challenges posed to the 
toleration as recognition approach that emphasize an individual right to liberty. On his 
view, liberty is affirmed in the idea of an equal right to opportunities for self-determination 
(Patten, 2014). Equality is affirmed in the idea of an equal treatment standard that can 
measure whether opportunities for self-determination are fairly maintained. There is room 
for debate about adopting a distributive model for toleration, one that integrates the idea 
of fair equality of opportunity with the idea of liberty rights to religious freedom, freedom 
of association, and freedom of expression (Jones, 2017). Yet if we grant the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity for self-determination, we can see how it supports an idea of 
toleration that meets what would otherwise be the competing desideratum of the respect 
and recognition conceptions of toleration. 
3. Ethical Pluralism and Toleration 
Most work by liberal political philosophers focuses on value pluralism within a western 
religious, political, and cultural context. Classical liberals such as Locke and Mill framed 
questions about toleration in order to address that perspective. Some recent developments 
in comparative philosophy or what is sometimes called global philosophy point to a 
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different set of issues for a liberal view on toleration (Hashemi, 2009). Some of this work 
highlights pluralism across traditions, for example traditions that affirm an individualistic 
view of political morality and traditions that affirm collectivistic conceptions of political 
morality (Buchanan, 2013; Kim, 2014). This raises a number of challenging questions, 
including, are there reasonable yet incompatible conceptions of political morality, some of 
which are collectivistic and non-liberal? 
Those with expertise in Islamic political philosophy (March, 2019), Chinese political 
philosophy (Angle, 2012), or collectivistic conceptions of political morality that inform 
ideas about human rights (Buchanan, 2013), have offered interesting proposals on the 
prospects for liberal political values in these contexts. I draw on some of their work here 
not to add to their scholarship to but to examine questions for liberal toleration in 
comparative perspective. 
In his recent book on ideas about political authority and sovereignty within modern 
Islamic political thought Andrew March (2019) notes that within Sunni Islam an influential 
view holds that God authorizes the Muslim community – Umma – to form an Islamic 
democracy. In a formulation of the relation between religious and political authority that 
resembles a Lockean view one of the intellectuals who informed Kemalism in the early 
Turkish Republic, Ziya Gokalp, proclaimed, “God’s representative (on earth) is the 
people. . . . Authority belongs to the people and not to the Sultan. . . . To it belongs all 
power – legislative, judicial, and executive” (March, 2019, p. 38). Nader Hashemi (2009) 
examines contemporary debates among Shia political thinkers who stake out positions 
ranging from a defence of secular government, Islamic democracy, and theocracy. For 
example, Hashemi considers an interesting parallel between the Locke-Filmer debate on 
political authority and contemporary Iranian political thinkers (Hashemi, 2009, pp. 67–
102). Those who advocate a secular conception of political authority are more likely to 
favour toleration for Baha’i and others who face discrimination. Stephen Angle (2012) 
explores ways that within Confucian thought leadership is conferred by characteristics of 
a virtuous ruler whose moral authority to rule depends on having the right characteristics. 
Pluralism across states raises a different set of questions for liberal toleration than does 
pluralism within states. For example, Canada and the US have minority cultures and 
religions that embrace collectivistic and non-liberal values, yet the dominant political 
cultures reflect a broadly liberal perspective on individual liberty. There are significant 
differences between the minority status of someone who affirms liberalism in a non-liberal 
society and someone who affirms an illiberal view in a liberal society. A Lockean liberal 
living in the Chinese Republic does not have the same status under law as an Old Order 
Amish living in the USA. One obvious difference is that in one case a person might be 
exercising religious liberty, whereas in the other, a person is denied such liberty. 
In an interesting examination of Protestant and Hindu religious doctrine and practice 
Spinner-Halev (2005) notes that for most practising Hindus belonging to a practice is far 
more central than belief. Ritual is primary. Religious conscience is secondary. Liberal 
ideas about liberty and respect for conscience largely reflect the legacy of the impact of 
Protestant Christianity on early liberal thought. 
Belonging precedes belief for many religious persons, whatever the religious tradition 
and wherever it is practised. It is better to refer to degrees of individualism and degrees of 
collectivism in religious self-understanding. However, as a matter of doctrine, the priority 
of inner conviction over outward ritual plays a special role in Protestant Christianity. There 
is a clear connection between this Protestant conception of religious doctrine and the 
classical liberal liberty and toleration. A “thinker-based” approach to liberty, for example, 
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places emphasize on inner conviction and individual agency. By contrast rituals at the heart 
of a collective identity, religious or non-religious, may be understood as more basic, and a 
more important source of values and human identity. 
Many liberals will bristle at the thought of a communal “ritual-based” alternative to the 
thinker-based approach of Shiffrin. Yet that there are so many examples of collectivistic 
conceptions of value, including political morality, at odds with the value individualism 
central to liberalism raises an interesting challenge for liberal positions on toleration. It is 
one thing to ask, what is the most appropriate conception of toleration for citizens in a 
diverse society who agree that every citizen is free and equal? That question is challenging 
enough even when diverse citizens whose views are mutually intelligible to one another 
struggle to find shared bases for a liberal conception of toleration. Pluralism within and 
pluralism across traditions raise different kinds of challenges. One example of pluralism 
within a tradition is competing conceptions of liberal values, including debates over how 
to understand liberty and equality. Pluralism across traditions includes individualistic and 
collective conceptions of political morality that divide those who mostly agree with liberal 
political morality and those who do not. Of course, there are illiberal doctrines defended 
within the context of dominant liberal traditions as well as liberal doctrines defended in 
the context of dominant illiberal traditions. 
Open mindedness about conceptions of toleration need not entail affirming toleration 
without limits. Yet open mindedness about practices of toleration should be at the centre 
of liberal theories of toleration. Judgements about the basic moral convictions deemed 
essential to liberty and equality are frequently negotiated by people who disagree on some 
fundamental points. Taking the widely discussed options on pluralism within liberal 
societies and rethinking them in comparative perspective is one way to develop this idea. 
Another is to consider conceptions of toleration from within non-western traditions of 
political morality. The pursuit of these and other options should be embraced rather than 
resisted by liberal political philosophers. 
Lastly, an important issue that needs to be considered in this context is how dialogue 
across traditions is framed. There can be a chauvinism on the part of liberal political 
philosophers who assume that productive dialogue will result in a Chinese political 
philosopher embracing liberal values without mutual influence across traditions. Yet why 
should the influence be one-way? It is likely that there are forms of liberal toleration yet 
to be imagined, including those that reflect mutual influence across traditions. 
Conclusion 
The perspectives on toleration considered in this chapter highlight illiberal and liberal 
practices of toleration, cases where liberal states are sometimes more intolerant than non-
liberal states, as well as different formulations of toleration within liberal political 
philosophy. Having a taxonomy of conceptions of toleration can clarify a wide range of 
practices within both liberal and non-liberal states. This is helpful for at least two reasons. 
First, whether the best conceptions of toleration will be adapted to liberal political morality 
is a separate question from which practices qualify as a form of toleration. Second, the 
paradigm cases that liberal political philosophers examine are important, yet also limited. 
There are both global and historical perspectives on toleration that can inform how we 
think about toleration. Why limit cases and examples of toleration to modern or to western 
states unless we are offering a proposal for toleration that applies to just those contexts? 
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Whether theories of toleration offer helpful perspective on moral progress, reform or 
diffusing political conflicts will depend in part on open mindedness about how states and 
persons can realize practices of toleration. A selection bias informs many liberal accounts 
of toleration: these accounts focus on cases in the American or European context. The 
headscarf debates in Europe or the religious exemptions debate in the US are important 
cases for thinking about toleration. Thinking about political and moral dimensions of 
toleration from just these perspectives comes at the risk of introducing a parochial bias in 
liberal views on toleration. It also encourages political philosophers to overlook biases in 
how they think about the political values that inform their understanding of toleration. 
Consideration of non-liberal practices of toleration and the pluralist challenge can help us 
appreciate the limitations of standard positions. 
To conclude, a consideration of various forms of pluralism and their implications for 
toleration might lead to more or less radical positions. Chandran Kukathas (2017) has 
recently argued for a conception of toleration without limits, a conception informed by 
skepticism about attempts to justify limits to toleration with the harm principle, a basic 
right to justification, or some other standard. That is one possible outcome. Another option 
is to defend a kind of moral minimalism as a basis for toleration. Forst defends such a view 
when he claims, “No other values or norms except the principle of justification itself can 
provide the foundation of . . . toleration” (Forst, 2013, p. 400). A comparative or global 
philosophy approach might lead to third outcome, one that affirms value pluralism in a 
way that supports multiple conceptions of toleration. The main focus of this chapter has 
been on liberalism and toleration, yet the central ideas are presented with the recognition 
that there are many more questions to examine than have hitherto been adequately 
addressed. 
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